Introduction
The surge of market distress and the rapid spread of uncertainty may lead a significant number of market players to rethink their priorities and investment strategies triggering a rebalancing of their portfolio toward safer type of assets (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008) . When investors have similar portfolios, coordinated rebalancing might lead to massive sales and purchases of assets Wagalath, 2013, 2014) . In the presence of finite liquidity, these "fire sale" episodes can lead to sudden and large price movements, with a consequent significant increase of financial systemic risk. In particular, in periods of financial turmoil, financial investors try to liquidate risky assets and to purchase safer and less risky ones. Episodes of this type are commonly referred to as "flight-to-quality" and can play a prominent role in the propagation and deepening of financial crises. Thus, the ability of identifying and possibly anticipating (at least partially) such phenomena is of great importance also in the context of early-warning and monitoring of systemic risk (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Harrington, 2009; Scheffer et al., 2009; Barrell et al., 2010; Duttagupta and Cashin, 2011; Kritzman et al., 2011; Allen et al., 2012; Arnold et al., 2012; Bisias et al., 2012; Scheffer et al., 2012; Merton et al., 2013; Oet et al., 2013) . Moreover the identification of flight-to-quality episodes is of great importance as a measure of the market perception of the quality of the assets.
In empirical studies of systemic risk there are two possible approaches. The first one is characterized by the adoption of proprietary data on portfolio compositions, exposures, trades, etc., data typically unavailable or partially available only in central banks. The second approach makes use of econometric analyses of publicly available market data (e.g. prices and/or volumes) in order to identify, characterize, and possibly forecast episodes of systemic risk. In this paper we follow the second approach to identify flight-to-quality episodes, focusing our attention to the relation between banks and sovereign bonds in the period 2006-2014. Our analysis starts from the simple consideration that, prior and during a crisis event, systemically relevant banks are likely to experience large drops in their equity values. Accordingly, crises are identified by events originated in the left-tail of the equity log-returns distribution of global systemically important banks 1 . Since big market players are usually levered institutions pursuing a target or pro-cyclical leverage 2 strategy Shin, 2010, 2014; Greenwood et al., 2015) and since sovereign debt securities form a considerable fraction of banks' total assets, a portfolio rebalancing of a bank will most likely involve the trading of large quantities of sovereign bonds. Due to market impact and assets' illiquidity, large movements of bond prices (and hence of bond yields) are expected as a consequence of the flight-to-quality behavior of banks triggered by the large equity drop. Risk exposure can, in fact, be reduced by selling risky assets and moving capitals toward safer investments. Hence, large sovereign bond yield variations tend to occur after periods of financial distress in which many large banks are hit by dramatic losses in their equity capitals.
As a motivation for the proposed econometric method, first we present a stylized model of flight-toquality inspired by the theoretical models of Corsi et al. (2013) and Lillo and Pirino (2015) (which are, in turn, inspired by previous works by Shin, 2010, 2014; Greenwood et al., 2015 , among others) of the feedback between equity of institutions and price of assets. Specifically we show, by means of a simple portfolio optimization model, that if two types of assets are available in the economy, a safe one and a risky one, a VaR-constrained profit-maximizer will react to a drop of the equity by purchasing the safe asset and selling the risky one. In fact, the model predicts that equity drops of financial institutions will simultaneously increase the demand of safe assets and the supply of riskier assets. Because of market impact, this in turn drives an upward (downward) movement of price of safe (risky) asset. In order to econometrically identify this chain of events from market prices, we propose to use Granger-test for tail dependence of Hong et al. (2009) . Applied to the banks-sovereign bonds relation, the test identifies when a tail event in the distribution of the equity log-return of a bank helps forecasting a tail event in the distribution of the yield variations of a given sovereign bond.
Considering a set of banks and sovereign bonds in a systemic perspective, the information on flightto-quality episodes can be described by a bank-asset bipartite network 3 where the link between a bank and a bond indicates the existence of Granger causality in tail. More precisely, we define connectivity and centrality measures of the Granger-causality networks that have a simple economic interpretation in terms of indicators of distressed selling and distressed buying. In addition, we adopt country ratings from
Standard & Poor's (S&P) to discriminate between "good" and "bad" sovereign debts. We can thus identify periods when a significant amount of distress selling has hit the class of "bad" bonds while a significant amount of distress buying was simultaneously hitting the "good" ones. This double effect corresponds to a natural characterization of flight-to-quality, where the general distrust pushes investors toward low-risk assets. Our proposed flight-to-quality measure possesses several appealing features: (i) it is computed from standard equity and bond (daily) market prices; (ii) it is able to identify different patterns of flight-to-quality behavior; (iii) allows the derivation of several connectedness and centrality network metrics having significant cross-sectional forecasting power for the bond quality.
Our paper has been particularly inspired by two important works belonging to two different streams of the literature which we attempt to connect: the paper of Beber et al. (2009) on flight-to-quality and the paper of Billio et al. (2012) on networks of Granger-causality.
The analysis by Beber et al. (2009) sheds insightful light on how liquidity and quality are chased in the market. Unusual capital flows are used in Beber et al. (2009) to proxy flights, both to liquidity and to quality.
They document that investors care of both liquidity and quality, but they do it at different times. More precisely, in period of market distress characterized by a high level of uncertainty, investors require liquidity rather than quality. Besides, liquidity plays a non-trivial role even in the pricing of bonds during period of increased uncertainty. Defining an econometric measures of flight-to-quality based on easily available daily market prices, considerably reduces the data requirements in our approach since the detailed information on the order flow is now inferred from data. This allow us to considerably extend the time span of our analysis compared to the one in Beber et al. (2009) considering the equity and bond market developments from the beginning of 2006 to February 2014. As a consequence, our analysis profits from the presence of two important periods of financial distress. Complementing the results of Beber et al. (2009) we document that investors (in our case systemically important banks), do chase for quality during financial crisis, but they do it in different ways: in some cases, such as during and after the Lehman crisis, they simply chase quality by buying sovereign debt of any type, while in others, such as during the European sovereign debt crisis, they require only top-quality sovereign debt, i.e. the flight-to-quality occurs exclusively toward AAA-rated sovereign bonds.
Networks of Granger-causality have been introduced in systemic risk studies by Billio et al. (2012) to identify and quantify periods of financial turbulence, characterized by abnormal levels of Granger interconnectedness among equities of hedge funds, banks, broker/dealers, and insurance companies. Our paper, although being inspired by the analysis of Billio et al. (2012) , moves away from it in at least two respects:
first, we adopt a bipartite network of equities and bonds, a choice dictated by the will of investigating the effect of crises on sovereign debt and, second, we adopt the Granger-causality test in the tail by Hong et al.
(2009), since we believe that it is suited to describe events pertaining to a crisis, hence of extraordinary nature. Moreover, the test is able to identify the "sign" of the causality, in the sense that it can distinguish if an event in the right or in the left tail of the caused variable is anticipated by an event in one of the two tails of the causing variable.
We adopt four additional definitions of bond quality based on either the correlation between CDS spreads and the bond yields or the bond yield volatility and the yield spreads, defined as the difference between a government bond yield and the German bond yield at the same maturity. This gives us the possibility of having a time-varying measure of quality independent from the S&P rating of the country and, hence, to test the out-of-sample forecast performances of the newly defined network centrality measures. We find that during period of crises, both for the 2007 but especially for the Eurozone crisis, the Granger centrality measures show a significant forecasting power on the bond quality measures.
It is important to stress that the method we present is more general than the specific application to flight-to-quality episodes of systemically important banks toward sovereign bonds and can be applied to other financial institutions (e.g. mutual funds, hedge funds, etc.) and other asset classes (e,g, equities,
corporate bonds, etc.). In particular it could be used to identify episodes of fire sale in the financial market, not necessarily related to flight to quality.
It is however worth remembering that the econometric evidence of a tail causality does not necessarily implies that the bank has executed a distressed selling (or buying) on the corresponding bond. We do not observe directly trading activity and thus our approach should be interpreted with all the limitations of the original causality by Granger (1969) . In other words, our method must be interpreted with an "as if"
approach. Nevertheless, the presence of tail causality between the time series represented by two nodes is an important indicator of the propagation of risk between them.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is dedicated to outline the motivational portfolio optimization model. The main implication of the model is summarized in Proposition 1, whose proof is given in Appendix A. In Section 3 we present the Granger-causality in tail as our method to identify econometrically portfolio rebalancing and in Section 4 we present the investigated dataset. In Section 5 we describe the structure of the bipartite network of tail causality and in Section 6 we present our definitions of flight-to-quality metrics and we study their dynamics. Section 7 describes the out of sample forecasting tests for the quality of the bond based on the properties of the bipartite network. Finally, in Section 8 we draw some conclusions.
A simple model of flight-to-quality
As anticipated in the Introduction, the first contribution of the present paper is a portfolio optimization model of a simplified economy in which an investor can choose between two types of assets: a safe one with low expected return and a risky one with high expected return. In line with the recent theoretical and empirical literature on bank behavior (Daníelsson et al., 2004; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2010; Duarte and Eisenbach, 2013; Adrian and Shin, 2014) , financial institutions are confronted with a Value at Risk (VaR) type of constraints. The final purpose is to understand the consequences of such a VaR constraint on the decision making process of a profit maximizer.
Consider then an investor who can invest only into two assets a and b. We proxy riskiness of the investments by their volatilities. Hence let σ a and σ b be the volatilities of, respectively, asset a and b, and assume (without loss of generality) that σ a < σ b . Assuming positive risk premia and denoting by µ a (resp. µ b ) the expected return of asset a (resp. b) we have that µ a < µ b . Let ω be the percentage of total asset invested in the safe asset a and 1 − ω the corresponding percentage invested in the risky asset b. The investor has to find the optimal total asset A and the optimal ω that solve
where E is the total equity provided to the investor, α is a parameter that determines which quantile 4 of the VaR is used in the constraint, the matrix Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of the two assets
, the two vectors µ and ω are, respectively, the vector of asset returns and the vector of portfolio weights
and, finally, the notation ω indicates the transpose of ω. Note that we are not imposing ω > 0, since a short-position may be profitable for the investor. Under this general setting we are able to prove the following Proposition 1 A profit-maximizer that allocates the available resources according to (1) always reacts to equity drops with a flight-to-quality. In formula
Proof. See Appendix A.
The implications of the model are summarized by inequality (2). During periods of financial distress (dE < 0) the VaR-constrained investor will simultaneously purchase safe investments (dω > 0) and sell the risky ones (d (1 − ω) < 0). In the context of the bi-partite network of systemically relevant banks and sovereign bonds analyzed in this paper, we expect that, during financial crises, a simultaneous distressed selling of risky bonds is accompanied with a massive purchase of good quality bonds. We stress that, in the model presented above, the investor is allowed to choose the optimal A. Hence, as a compensation of the equity drop, the investor could in principle choose to solely reduce the optimal total asset A, leaving the portfolio allocation ω untouched. In practice, the total asset is reduced by the same amount of the equity drop 5 together with a reduction of the exposure to the risky bond. Simply put, the flight-to-quality phenomenon is not affected by the possibility of choosing the optimal A.
The model helps understanding that an equity drop of a financial institution will lead to a liquidation of risky assets and purchases of safe assets. Because of finite liquidity, this excess demand/supply will move upward (downward) the price of safe (risky) assets. It is therefore natural to search, in market data, for dependencies between extreme movements of the equity of financial institutions and extreme movements of asset prices, as an indication of flight-to-quality episodes. This is the focus and the main goal of the next Section.
3 Tail Granger-causality for identifying distressed portfolio rebalancing
In this paper, in order to identify distressed portfolio rebalancing, we adopt a purely econometric approach that only requires standard time series of banks' equities and sovereign bond yields. This choice has the advantage of being implementable at frequencies from moderate to high (weekly, daily or even more, depending on the availability of data) without requiring any not publicly available dataset, such as order flow data, which are notoriously very hard to obtain. As anticipated in the introduction, we look for those chains of events in which a large negative equity drop of a systemically important bank causes a significant variation (positive or negative) of a given sovereign bond yield. We adopt the statistical test proposed by Hong et al. (2009) , which is summarized below. The final outcome of the econometric machinery is a bi-partite network of Granger causalities in tail (or risk). We interpret the presence of a link in such network as an indirect evidence of a distress buying or selling of the bond by the bank with the interpretative precaution mentioned in the Introduction.
The Granger-causality test for tail dependence of Hong et al. (2009) works as follow. Given two time
and {Y 2,t } T t=1 (think at the former as the series of bond yield variations and at the latter as the series of equity log-returns), the first step of the procedure is to identify which are the extreme events in the history of both. For this purpose, following the approach of Hong et al. (2009) . For the parametric model, as well as the numerical routines, we borrow from the popular approach developed by Engle and Manganelli (2004) . For more detail about the VaR model and the corresponding parameter estimates we refer to Appendix B. The outcome of the Engle and Manganelli (2004) procedure is a parametric estimate of the conditional VaR series V 
where Ω t denotes the information available at time t and α defines the tail of the distribution. We choose α = 10% as a trade-off between the necessity of focusing on extreme events and that of having a sufficiently high number of observations. Once the two conditional VaR series have been estimated we can apply the one-way Granger-causality test by Hong et al. (2009) . The test compares the null
against the alternative
The interpretation of H 0 1 and H 1 1 is straightforward. If the null hypothesis is rejected with some confidence, in the time interval [t start , t end ], this means that the information of the occurrence of a large event in Y 2,t during [t start , t end ] has significantly impacted the probability of a future occurrence of a extraordinary event in Y 1,t . Note that the conditioning information includes at most instant t − 1, while the conditioned event
is occurring at t, whence the genuine causality of the approach. Notice also that in the test we are not considering simultaneous dependencies.
Define the hit series as Z i,t ≡ 1 Yi,t<−V (α) i,t for i = 1, 2 and t = 1, ..., T , and let ρ (j) be the sample cross-correlation function between {Z 1,t } T t=1 and {Z 2,t } T t=1 at positive lag j, i.e. consider
The sample cross-correlation function is thus written as
where
when both the number of observation T → ∞ and the bandwidth M = c T ν → ∞ (c > 0, 0 < ν < 
which implies that the test has asymptotic unit power at any confidence level. If Q 1 (M ) > c β , where c β is the β-quantile of a Normal distribution function with zero mean and unit standard deviation, then we say
Granger-causes the series {Y 1,t } T t=1 in the tail (or in risk). Throughout the analysis we choose β = 95% and hence c β = 1.6449. Moreover, following the small-sample properties of the test as reported by Hong et al. (2009) , we set M = 5 for the value of the bandwidth parameter.
Since our interest is in exploring causal relationships between equities and bonds, we have to specify both the direction of causality and which tail (left or right) of the two distributions are involved in the test. In this paper, we will limit our analysis to causality links between the left tail (losses) of the bank equity distribution and both the left and right tails of bond yield distribution. The economic interpretation is straightforward. In the former case, a negative shock in equity capital for institution j is causing large negative bond yield variations for country i, and this is interpreted as if the bond is being bought. Vice versa, in the latter, a negative shock in equity capital is causing a sudden increase of bond yields, and this is interpreted as a distressed selling against the corresponding sovereign debt. For the sake of readability, we will denote a distressed buy of bank j of bonds i as (E j =⇒ B Buy i ) while a distress selling bank j of bonds i
For completeness and in order to compare our results with those of Billio et al. (2012) , we also perform standard Granger (1969) causality tests, whose theory is briefly summarized in Appendix D. In this case, if the j-th equity log-returns series Granger-causes the i-th series of sovereign bond yield variations, we write (E j =⇒ B i ). Contrary to Hong et al. (2009) , the standard Granger (1969) causality tests only controls for causality between the central moments of the pair of distributions under analysis.
Since we aim at implementing a dynamical analysis, we paid particular care in the construction of both the VaR measure and the Granger-causality test to fully preserves causality using, at any point in time, only past information. Appendix B describes in detail the solution adopted. It is important to mention that we circumvent contingent problems generated by the asynchronicity of the data by sampling all time series 6 In our analysis we adopt the Daniell kernel k (x) = sin (π x) /x. every two-days, hence bond yield variations and equity log-returns must be thought as variations on a time scale of two days.
The Dataset
Our dataset is composed of j = 1, ..., 33 equities of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) defined by Basel III regulatory framework and i = 1, ..., 36 sovereign debt bonds (with a maturity of 5 years) of different countries in America, Europe and Asia. We indicate with γ i,t the nominal 5-years maturity bond yield of country i at day t. For each country i we have also at our disposal the daily time series of five-years maturity CDS spread, a quantity that we indicate as S i,t henceforth. Detailed informations, along with Tables with summary statistics, on the three blocks of data are provided, for the sake of readability, in Appendix C.
Finally, we mention that in Section 7.1, in order to properly define the quality measures based on the correlation between CDS spreads and bond yields, we require a proxy for the risk-free interest rate r. For each bond, depending on the currency, we use the zero-coupon curve of the corresponding maturity and currency derived by a bootstrapping procedure 7 .
Bipartite networks of tail causality
In order to build a network of Granger-causality in the tail, we construct a sequence of time-windows of three years length 8 . For a given time-window t, we compute the networks of the significant causal links in the tail E j =⇒ B ) t , where now the additional subscript t is indicating that the causal networks are time-dependent since they are computed using observations prior to the end of the t-th time-window 9 . In addition, we also compute the network from the standard Granger (1969) causality test
Six snapshots of the equity-bond bipartite network of tail risks are shown in Figure 1 (for the sake of exposition the networks based on the Granger (1969) The purpose is to give a visual perception of the differences in the topology of the network between normal and crisis periods. Specifically, during episodes of financial turmoils, it is evident that (E j =⇒ B ) t causal links are mainly oriented toward bonds with rating ranging from AA to BB. This evidence anticipates the results of Section 6, where 7 All the zero-coupon curves are elaborated, via a bootstrapping procedure representing the best-practice in the industry, by a dedicated desk of UniCredit Group.
8 The choice of three years balances the trade-off between the power of the Granger test (as reported in the simulation study of Hong et al., 2009 ) and the need of localizing periods of financial distress.
9 Since each time series (either on the equity and on the bond side, see Tables 4 and 5 ) starts at a different day, for any equity-bond pair we check if the overlap of the two time series contains more than 10 observations, which in the two-days subsampled grid roughly corresponds to one-month. However, in the great majority of cases, we get almost a full overlap which corresponds to 390 observations (three years of 2-working-day sub-sampled observations). (4) ACA (2) GLE (1) BNP (1) RBS (2) STAN ( Belgium (1) Croatia (1) Cyprus (2) Finland France
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we propose a formal test to confirm that, during the depicted periods, the number of distress buying directed toward AAA rated bonds and that of distress selling toward the remaining ones is not compatible with a random graph.
As in Billio et al. (2012) , we are interested in measuring of the density of the network (also called connectedness) whose deviation from the expected value under the null of no causal relationship may signal the presence of systemic events or distress. As a first investigation we define the two quantities
where N 
Figure 2 reports the two measures of connectedness defined in (5) and the Granger (1969)-based measure defined in (7), as a function of time. Note that, being all statistical tests for each equity-bond pair performed with a confidence level of 5%, under the null of no-causality we expect to find, for the three connectedness measures, a value around 5%. In fact, the confidence levels under the null of no-causality may be higher due to finite-sample effects or estimation errors. For this reason we compute confidence levels of the three types of causality using a bootstrap procedure described in Appendix E. As a results we obtain three different levels, one for each causality, reported in Figure 2 with the same line styles of the corresponding measure of connectedness. The levels for the two measures defined in (5) are slightly greater than that of the Granger the first is characterized by a strong increase in sovereign bond purchases which is not accompanied by a substantial rise in sovereign bond selling; while the second crisis features the contemporaneous presence of both generalized distress buying and distress selling of sovereign bond. We will further investigate and discuss this evidence in the next section. Finally, we note that the original Granger (1969)-based centrality measure produces a weaker signal compared to the tail Granger-causality measures, being significant only during the Eurozone crisis, and appear to be highly related with the indicator of distressed selling.
Flight to quality
In this section we develop our econometric measure of flight-to-quality built upon the Granger causal networks previously defined. A flight-to-quality episode is commonly referred to as a conveyance of capital from risky assets to more secure ones thus accepting to receive lower expected returns. Such events are triggered by particularly distressed states of the market in which the risk aversion of investors may suddenly increase.
As clearly spelled out in Anderson and Liu (2013) , [...] in times of turmoil, investors accept zero or negative nominal yields as a fee for safety.
The crucial point here is to understand which kind of quality is sought by market players in each period.
First we need to identify a proxy for the quality of sovereign bond. For this analysis we use the historical S&P's ratings. More precisely, for each bond in the dataset, we have at our disposal the historical S&P's ratings divided into 10 different rating classes 10 . We aggregate these 10 rating classes into two broad categories which we generically denote as "good" and "bad" bonds. Clearly, this broad classification will depend on how strict the definition of a "good" bond is. In order to investigate the different level of quality requested by the market in different periods, we consider two different definitions of "good" bonds. In the first definition, that will be referred to as the weak definition of quality, we define "good" bonds as those with a rating between AAA and A and "bad" bonds the remaining ones. The second definition, that will be referred as the strong definition of quality, is more stringent since classified a bond as "good" only if the corresponding country has a AAA rating. Hence, for each time-window t, we define the indicator function 1 i∈Good (t) as equal to one if bond i is rated in the "good" category in the time-window t and zero otherwise. Similarly, 1 i∈Bad (t) is the indicator function that equals one if bond i is rated in the "bad" category in the time-window t and zero otherwise.
We then consider the four quantities
.
For example, Good
Buy t is the average number of buy causal links hitting a bond of the category Good. These metrics can be interpreted as an index of distressed buying or distressed selling, depending on the kind of causal relationship adopted. Figure 3 shows their time series, distinguishing between the two definitions of quality, together with the corresponding levels under the null of no causality. The left and right columns of Figure 3 ), is likely to be a consequence of a flight-to-quality from toxic assets (such as subprime mortgages) to highly rated sovereign debts. However, since our dataset does not include any of the assets that were perceived as toxic during the subprime mortgage crisis, we cannot fully investigate such type of flight-to-quality. Nevertheless, our analysis clearly points towards the existence of two different types of flightto-quality: in the first one (during the 2007 − 2008 financial crisis) major banks rebalanced their portfolio from risky equity and structured asset to sovereign bonds, while in the second one (during the 2009 − 2011 Eurozone crisis) they rebalanced mainly their sovereign bond portfolio from low and medium-rated bonds to top-rated bonds. The latter could thus be termed a "flight-to-top-quality" event.
The hypothesis of occurrence of different flight-to-quality episodes suggested by the plots of Figure 3 can be statistically validated comparing the number of hits per category with those expected under the null in which links from equities to bond are randomly assigned. The computation of these expected values under the null is straightforward: if bonds were randomly hit by equities without any preference toward a specific category, then the probability to observe less than N Buy Good,t hits is given by the cumulative binomial distribution
is the probability of having a good rated bonds at time t and where
the total number of significant (E j =⇒ B Buy i ) t links. The computation of P Sell Bad,t and the other probabilities follows the same rule.
When the probability in (9) is larger than a threshold p (e.g. p = 99%), it means that there is a statistically significant number of (E j =⇒ B lines correspond to p = 99%, thick red dotted ones to p = 97.5% and thin dotted blue lines to p = 95%.
The scenario depicted by the results of Figure 4 confirms the intuition that we got from the preliminary analysis inspired by the plots in Figure 3 and from the network snapshots of Figure 1 : quality is required as consequence of the turmoil and distrust spread by the Eurozone crisis, and the phenomenon is well-identified if quality is defined by top-quality AAA-rated bonds. In fact, with the weak definition of quality, we find only one highly significant period of flight-to-quality after mid-2009 and many other less significant scattered all around the time stamp. On the contrary, the strong definition gives a concentrated sequence of highly significant events around the Eurozone crisis and even before the beginning of 2009. In each panel of Figure   4 we add a black curve in correspondence of the arithmetic mean of the two probabilities P Buy Good,t and P Sell Bad,t . This quantity may be thought as an early indicator of flight-to-quality. In fact, while the weak definition of quality returns a quite noisy path for such an indicator, in the strong definition we observe a much more smooth curve. In particular, in the case of the right panel, the indicator starts increasing in mid-2007, much before the onset of the Eurozone crisis, and peaks some months before 2009. This result could be conjectured to be a consequence of the capability of big market player of fearing the effect of the 2007 financial crisis on the the sovereign debt of countries with a weak fiscal discipline, although a deeper analysis is required to confirm such an hypothesis.
Out-of-sample analysis
In order to test the predictive power of the Granger analysis we perform out-of-sample regressions which, in spirit, follow the approach proposed in Billio et al. (2012) . For a given time-window t and a given sovereign bond i, we define the three centrality measures
which, in network terms, are the degree of the bond nodes. The economic interpretation of the quantities defined above is straightforward. For example H Sell i,t is the percentage of significant causal links (E j =⇒ B Sell i ) coming from the equity side of the network that hit the i-th bond in the time-window t. Large values of H Sell i,t are expected when the i-th bond is subject to a large amount of distressed selling. Thus, a similar interpretation is valid for H Buy i,t , although the economic interpretation of H i,t is less direct, since the Granger (1969) captures causality in mean. Nevertheless, in our out-of-sample forecast exercise, we take into consideration H i,t as well for comparison.
Dynamic proxies of quality
In this section we adopt and describe four proxies of sovereign bond quality that are defined "dynamically" in the sense of a continuous, time-dependent, real variables, in opposition to agency ratings that are piecewise constant categorical variables. A finer description of the bond quality is needed since the the idea is to test the forecasting power of suitable centrality measures of the causality networks in predicting the bond quality.
For this purpose agency ratings are not particularly suited mainly because they are almost constant during time and, when they change, they signal a huge downgrade or, more rarely, a huge upgrade of the sovereign debt quality.
Our conjecture is that, during periods in which systemic events are in place, centrality measure play an import an role in forecasting the future bond quality. This would corroborate their role as early warning indicators of systemic risk.
The first proxy is based on the correlation between the series of sovereign bond yields and the corresponding credit default swap of a given country. A simple absence of arbitrage argument links the spread S of CDS with the par-yield γ of a bond of the same entity. As pointed out by Hull et al. (2004) , the difference between a CDS spread and the corresponding par-yield should equal the risk-free rate, or
The difference between a CDS spread and the excess par-yield over the risk-free rate, b = S − (γ − r), is usually referred as the basis. Hence, the no-arbitrage condition requires the basis to be zero. On a large sample of companies and sovereign data, Hull et al. (2004) find that the no-arbitrage relationship between CDS and par-yield holds fairly well, with a risk-free rate slightly smaller than the swap rate and above the Treasury rate. In our dataset 11 we observe that, especially in periods of financial distress, such arbitrage relationship is often violated, particularly for those countries whose credit quality is commonly perceived as remarkably good. Russia (left) and Germany (right). The bond-yield reported is the nominal par-yield after the subtraction of the zero-coupon curve, whose computation is mentioned in Section 4, and hence it should equal the CDS spread according to the no-arbitrage condition (11). The period depicted includes the Eurozone crisis.
The plots in Figure 5 put in evidence that, while Russia has a CDS-bond correlation of almost 100%, in agreement with the no-arbitrage constraint, the case of Germany is totally different, showing even a negative CDS-bond correlation. Intuitively, CDS spreads increase during a period of crisis since investors require higher premium, however the behavior of bond yield can be very different according to the perceived credit quality of the country. The case of Germany is the most striking: large capital flows are directed toward the German sovereign debt pushing downward the level of the corresponding yield, while the CDS spread continues its rise as a consequence of the generalized increase in global credit risk. This empirical evidence has been somehow foreseen by the past literature. In fact, price gaps among securities with identical cash flow have been theoretically justified by the general equilibrium model by Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011) , where the surge the CDS-bond basis is due to negative shocks to the economy that force agents to hit their 11 Our dataset has almost zero overlap on time with that of Hull et al. (2004) . their margin constraints. Moreover the formation of CDS-bond bases has been recently addressed as the consequence of flight-to-quality episodes (Fontana and Scheicher, 2010 ).
In our analysis we do not investigate the determinants of CDS-bond bases, limiting ourselves to the ranking of bond quality obtained by using the CDS-bond correlation. In the light of the empirical evidences of Figure 5 and the most recent interpretation of the CDS-bond joint dynamics, we introduce our first dynamical proxy for quality as the one minus the CDS-bond correlation, i.e.
where the capital letter C is introduced to remind that the quality proxy is based on the CDS-bond correlation 12 coefficient and where ∆γ i,t and ∆S i,t indicates, respectively, the series of one-lag difference for γ i,t and S i,t .
The first column of Table 1 In order to have a multifaceted description of the bond quality, we introduce three further measures that are obtained exclusively using the bond yields time series. The simplest univariate measure related to bond quality is the bond yield "realized volatility", defined as
where γ i,t indicates the daily series of the nominal bond yield for country i. The larger the value of RV i the greater the uncertainty about its value, hence we expect RV i to be inversely related to bond quality. This intuition is confirmed by the second column of Table 1 , where countries are ranked according to increasing values of RV i , with Japan being the less volatile and Greece at the end of the ranking.
The remaining two measures are based on yield spreads defined in the standard way, i.e. the difference between a given sovereign bond yield and the corresponding German bond yield at the same maturity (which is, in our applications, five years). The introduction of yield spreads in our analysis is justified by the vast literature on the role of spreads in many aspects of the global economy. For example, the prominent role of spreads in the European Monetary Union as a source of risk is analyzed, much before the Eurozone crises, by Geyer et al. (2004) with the adoption of a two-factors model. Moreover, Manganelli and Wolswijk (2009) investigate the relationship between macro-economic policies and yield spreads. Their empirical findings confirm that changes in interest rates affect the risk-aversion of investors producing a significant impact on yield spreads. Global spreads and fiscal fundamentals of the euro area are used to proxy expected exchange rate devaluation in an econometric model for euro area spread by Favero (2013) . De Santis (2014) identifies a flight-to-liquidity premium as the only factor explaining the sovereign spreads for countries with low credit risk such as Netherlands and Finland.
The yield spread is formally defined as s i,t = γ i,t − γ GER,t , where γ GER,t is the bond yield for Germany.
The spread-based measures that we adopt are defined as
which represent, respectively, the average and the maximum spread in the period after January, 1, 2007.
Note that, as for RV i , the spread-based measures are expected to be inversely related to quality. This is confirmed by the third and fourth columns of Table 1 where, typically, we observe countries like Greece or Portugal with the highest values of the spread-based measures and Switzerland, Singapore and Netherlands among the lowest ones 13 .
We adapt the definitions of the four quality proxies introduced above in order to perform genuine outof-sample forecasts. For this purpose, we dynamically compute the quality proxies over a moving windows (t, t + h] with h the number of days ahead over which the forecast is performed. Then, the four quality proxies are dynamically restated as
Similarly to what it is done in Billio et al. (2012) , in order to mitigate the effect of outliers (see, for example, the case of Greece in 
Out-of-sample cross-sectional regressions
The out-of-sample regressions that we run are designed to test if, especially in periods of distress, the crosssectional rankings of bond quality proxies can be predicted by past bond centrality measures. Since each of the dynamical proxies of quality is expected to be persistent (or strongly persistent in the case of realized volatility) it is important, to avoid spurious results, to include the lagged value of the dependent variable 13 Germany has trivially a zero value for all these spread-based measures.
14 Hence H Sell i,t ≈ 1 for the bond with the highest value of H Sell i,t and H Sell i,t ≈ 0 for that with the lowest value. Note: Each of the four panels contains the ranking of all countries according to the corresponding variable reported in the column label. Each variable is computed using all data available after 2007. More precisely, Ci is the defined as 1 − ρi where ρi is the sample correlation between the sovereign bond yield and the CDS spread (and it is plotted in decreasing order). RVi is the realized volatility of bond yield variations. s Si and SMi are, respectively mean and maximum value of the spread between the bond of the i-th country and the German bond.
in the forecasting regression. It is also important to stress that, at any point in time, the regressors (i.e. the centrality measures (10) and the lagged dependent variable) and the dependent variables (one of the quality proxies (13)) are computed over time windows having zero overlaps. More precisely, the regressors are computed on a past time horizon that is (t − h, t] for the lagged dependent variable and that is the three years preceding t for the network centrality measures. The regressors are indicated with the subscript t, while the chosen dependent variable (i.e. one among the four quality proxies) is calculated over the forecasting period (t, t + h] and denoted with the subscript t + h.
In our analysis we adopt a twofold strategy. First, for every t, we run the two nested cross-sectional regressions
and
where Y i,t is the ranking of one among C i,t , RV i,t , s S i,t and SM i,t defined in (13), while the independent variable X i,t is the ranking of one among the centrality measures defined in (10).
In the setting of equations (14)- (15) 
For this regression we compute the t-statistics of β t and the p-value of the Vuong (1989) 
Results
The regression results are depicted in Figures from 6 to 9 18 and can be summarized in three main empirical findings.
First, the black points in Figure 6 shows a significant negative impact of H Figure 6: This figure depicts, for each time-window t = 1, ..., 99 whose closure is at day e t (reported in the horizontal axis), the t-statistic of β t in (15) where the dependent variable Y i,t is the ranking of the variable C H i,t defined in (13) and computed in the forecasting horizon (e t , e t + h], with h = 360. Each column corresponds to a different regressor X i,t in (15). More precisely, X i,t = H B+ i,t for the first, X i,t = H B− i,t for the second and X i,t = H i,t for the third. A black point is reported whenever the regression (15) is significantly better (according to a standard F-test with 95% confidence) than the simple auto-regressive model (14). Horizontal red dotted lines are in correspondence of 95% confidence level of the standard Normal distribution.
for the bond (see Table 1 ). On the contrary, the distressed buying indicator has no strong influence on future value of C i , besides the direction of the impact is also slightly noisy. Note that, as for the results in Third, the maximum spread is largely influenced by H Sell i,t for the entire period of the Eurozone crisis (we remember that each point of the horizontal axis refers to the previous three years for the dependent network centrality, and to the subsequent year for the dependent quality proxy) and even later.
In summary, we can assert that the percentage of significant (E j =⇒ B Figure 7: This figure depicts, for each time-window t = 1, ..., 99 whose closure is at day e t (reported in the horizontal axis), the t-statistic of β t in (15) where the dependent variable Y i,t is the ranking of the variable RV H i,t defined in (13) and computed in the forecasting horizon (e t , e t + h], with h = 360. Each column corresponds to a different regressor X i,t in (15). More precisely, X i,t = H B+ i,t for the first, X i,t = H B− i,t for the second and X i,t = H i,t for the third. A black point is reported whenever the regression (15) .., 99 whose closure is at day e t (reported in the horizontal axis), the t-statistic of β t in (15) where the dependent variable Y i,t is the ranking of the variable SM H i,t defined in (13) and computed in the forecasting horizon (e t , e t + h], with h = 360. Each column corresponds to a different regressor X i,t in (15). More precisely, X i,t = H B+ i,t for the first, X i,t = H B− i,t for the second and X i,t = H i,t for the third. A black point is reported whenever the regression (15) is significantly better (according to a standard F-test with 95% confidence) than the simple auto-regressive model (14). Horizontal red dotted lines are in correspondence of 95% confidence level of the standard Normal distribution. Figure 9: This figure depicts, for each time-window t = 1, ..., 99 whose closure is at day e t (reported in the horizontal axis), the t-statistic of β t in (16) where the dependent variable Y i,t is the ranking of the variable C H i,t defined in (13) and computed in the forecasting horizon (e t , e t + h], with h = 360 Each column corresponds to a different regressor X i,t in (16). More precisely, X i,t = H B+ i,t for the first, X i,t = H B− i,t for the second and X i,t = H i,t for the third. A black point is reported whenever the regression (16) is significantly better (according to the log-likelihood ratio test of Vuong (1989) with 95% confidence) than the simple auto-regressive model (14). Horizontal red dotted lines are in correspondence of 95% confidence level of the standard Normal distribution.
Conclusions
In this paper we introduce an econometric method to detect and analyze events of financial distress. It is designed to test if two variables are Granger-connected in the tails of their distributions, hence it is chiefly based on events of extraordinary nature. We derive Granger centrality measures of risk spillover between equity log-returns of 33 systemically relevant banks and government bond yield variations for 36 countries around the world. Moreover, we give a simple economic interpretation of such centrality measures in terms of indicators of distressed selling and distressed buying.
Exploiting the information of S&P country ratings, our empirical analysis evidences that, during the turbulent period of the Eurozone crisis, major banks across the world significantly impacted the sovereign bond market chasing for quality. More specifically, they looked for top-quality bonds, freeing capitals from the large part of non-AAA-rated bonds and moving them toward the AAA-rated ones. Besides, an intense buying activity of AAA-rated bonds is certified during the subprime mortgages crisis. Although, we do not have specific information on assets which were classified as toxic during the 2007 financial crisis, it is very likely that the surge of the distressed buying index for AAA-rated bonds is due to flight-to-quality episodes from the stock market to the government bond market. Adopting different dynamic measures of bond quality allow us to test the out-of-sample forecast performances of the centrality measures. The indicator of distressed selling has significant explanatory power in forecasting future values of the correlation between CDS spreads and the bond yield of a country, of the yield realized volatility and of the maximum spread with respect to the German bond. The behavior of the centrality measure based on the original Granger (1969) causality, although with a reduced forecasting power, is in line with the indicator of distressed selling.
Finally, the results of the analysis suggest the possibility of adopting the Hong et al. (2009) and Granger (1969) causality measures as early warning indicators of systemic risk. Our conjecture is that the red alarm should be switched on every time that the information contained in the network is able to improve the forecast of bond quality measures, or even when it turns out to be a better regressor that the past values of the quality measure itself. Although this appears as an intriguing application of the proposed methodology, it requires further verifications possibly with the adoption of high-frequency data and it is postpone for future research.
A Profit maximization with two assets.
In this Appendix we prove Proposition 1 stated in Section 2. To ease the readability, we report the constrained portfolio optimization below.
Before proceeding, we need to prove the following Lemma. The optimal solution of the optimization problem (17) is given by
Proof.
First consider that the VaR constraint
always binds since there is no profit for the investor in leaving part of its equity uninvested. The Lagrangian function to be maximized is thus
where γ is a Lagrange multiplier. The first-order condition associated to the total asset is written as
whose solution is
Putting the equation above in the VaR constraint returns the optimal γ as
The remaining first order condition is that relative to ω and it is written as
Using the constraint A = E/(α √ ω Σ ω) and equation (18) the condition in (19) becomes
Despite the appearance of the quadratic form ω Σ ω, the previous equation is of degree one in ω and gives as an optimal solution
We can now proof the proposition stated in the main text, which is reported here to ease readability.
Proposition. A profit-maximizer that allocates the available resources according to (17) always reacts to equity drops with a flight-to-quality. In formula dω dE < 0.
Proof.
Suppose that the equity is perturbed E → E + dE. If the debt is approximately constant (see Adrian and Shin, 2010) then the variation of the total asset equals the variation of the total equity, hence dA = dE.
The perturbation of the VaR constraint
where we have used dA = dE, x is the percentage equity shock dE = x E and where λ = A E > 1 is the optimal leverage. It is immediate to see that
Since λ > 1 the sign of dω is equal or opposite to that of dE according whether the quantity
is positive or negative. We show that the second case is the only one which is compatible with the optimality.
Re-write the optimal ω * in (20) as
Since risk premia are positive we have µ b −µa µa > 0 and hence
The inequality above implies that dE and dω have opposite signs. Therefore if a VaR-constrained bank is hit by a negative shock on its equity, it will react by buying a bonds and selling the risker b bonds (and vice versa if dE > 0). 2
B Time-adapted CAViaR
We first review the CAViaR estimation method introduced by Engle and Manganelli (2004) . Given a time
implicitly defined by the equation
The quantile regression developed by Engle and Manganelli (2004) allows for the estimation of any parametric model for V (α) t
. In testing tail risk spillovers among financial time series, Hong et al. (2009) adopt the asymmetric slope model that specifies
where the dependence of the β's from α has been omitted to ease the notation and where the Y + t−1 (resp. Y − t−1 ) denotes the positive (resp. negative) part. Volatility clustering implies that a strongly positive significant β 2 is expected. Concerning β 3 and β 4 they define, respectively, the impact of positive and negative returns on future Value-at-Risk. Models such that reported in equation (23) are estimated in Engle and Manganelli (2004) through a quantile regression. In estimating model (23) on equity and bond returns we adopt the same procedure as well (see Section 6 of Engle and Manganelli, 2004 , for more details). For our purposes, however, we have to take particular care since we are aimed at producing fully-causal time series of conditional Value-at-Risk of equity and bonds. Hence we have to fix two main issues. First, we want to have time series that are comparable with each other and then we have to mitigate the asynchronicity due to the different time zones of the countries in our dataset. Second, having in mind a Granger-type analysis, at each point in time only past information should be used to produce the Value-at-Risk estimates.
We start our procedure with a "training" window of six years. More precisely, to compute the initial value of the VaR time series, we use a window starting in t start = January, 1, 2001 and ending at t 
end is shifted by one month producing a new final date t end + 1 month and the estimation procedure, now using data from t start up to t
( 1) end is repeated. The generic n-th time window is thus formed using data from t start up to t i,t ( ϑi) where t spans across the 2-days time grid, Y i,t is either the series of bond yield variations or the series of equity log-returns, V
is the series of the estimated Value-at-Risk of Y i,t , and ϑ i = {β i , i = 1, ..., 4} is the parameter vector. We stress that, as mentioned in Section 5, while all the information available up to t (n) end is used to estimate the parametric model (23), the networks of Granger causalities adopts only data in the three years prior to
end , as a trade-off between the power of the causality tests and the necessity of isolating periods of financial distress.
In Tables 2-3 we report the estimated β's and the corresponding p-value (in brackets) for, respectively, the 36 sovereign debt bonds and the 33 systemically important financial institutions in our dataset, estimated using the entire time span. Numbers in bold identify 99% significant parameters. The adequacy of the fit is measured by the p-value of the Dynamical Quantile (DQ) test of Engle and Manganelli (2004) 
reported in
19 This choice does not affect country whose series is not available before January, 1, 2006. In fact, before proceeding to the estimation of the CAViaR model, we require that at least 100 (daily) observations of the series are present. This limitation is required since we initialize the CAViaR estimation with the first 10% of the series, hence a reasonable number of observations must be present in order to have a reliable estimate of V Engle and Manganelli (2004) . A value of the test below 1% means that the hypothesis that the model (23) fits the data is rejected with a confidence of 1%.
C Summary Statistics
This Appendix reports the summary statistics of the three blocks of data as introduced in Section 4. Table 4 shows a summary statistics of the series of bond yield variations used for the construction of the causal network. Moreover, for each country we add the information coming from historical S&P long-term foreign currency ratings that is explicitly used in the flight-to-quality analysis of Section 6.
Similarly, Table 5 reports a summary statistics for the time series of equity log-returns, which, typically, are available for longer time periods. As for the bond series, all equity series end at February, 14, 2014.
Note that in both Tables 4 and 5 the number of observations refers to the number of bond yield variations or equity log-returns in a two-days sub-sampled grid, and thus it is typically half of what it is expected from a daily time series. As anticipated in the main text, the sub-sampling is required in order to mitigate the effect of non-synchronous data (equities and bonds may refer to banks or countries that pertain to different parts of the world).
A third block of data is formed by CDS spreads. This part of the dataset is extensively adopted in Section 7.1 to define quality measures that are suitable for the proposed out-of-sample forecast exercise and that are (at least by construction) independent from the S&P country ratings. Tables   4 and 5 are related to one-lag differences (or log-differences) on a two-days subsampled grid, the summary for CDS spread is relative to the original daily grid. This is because, for a given country, the corresponding CDS spreads are used in Section 7.1 for the construction of a measure of bond quality in connection with the bond yield of the same country, hence there are no issues related to non-synchronicity of data. In this case we also rely on the original daily grid for bond yield as well. Note: Summary statistic for the equity sample. The first column indicates the bank ticker. The second column indicates the total number of available observations, that is the total number of innovations (one-lag log-differences of equity log-prices) in the two-days sub-sampled grid. Despite the starting date may vary from series to series, the ending date is February, 14, 2014 for all the equities. The third column is the starting date of the series, that is when the first price is available. Mean, Std, Kurt and Skew indicate, respectively, mean, standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness of the corresponding equity for the entire sample. 
where ε t+1 and ψ t+1 are i.i.d. normal shocks (with possibly non-zero mean). We say that {Y 2,t } T t=1 GrangerCauses the series {Y 1,t } T t=1 , and we write (2 =⇒ 1), at a confidence level α if the F-statistic of the two regressions is larger than the corresponding α-quantile of the F-distribution. Note that with this definition we are not testing for simultaneous causality. This choice is necessary in order to have a coherent comparison with the Q 1 (M ) test, which does not check for simultaneous risk spillover. Note that, if the first of the equation (24) is the true data generating process, we have
In particular we also have that 
Hence, since Prob Y i,t < −V In order to avoid spurious detections (induced by heteroskedasticity) of causalities in the Granger (1969)-causality network we follow the procedure adopted by Billio et al. (2012) and we filter out a GARCH(1, 1) model from data. That is, for each time series Y i,t , we estimate the model Y i,t = µ i + σ i,t ε i,t , ε i,t ∼ N (0, 1) ,
and the we normalize each time series by re-defining
where σ i,t is the estimated conditional volatility of model (27). This filtering is not required for the tail risk networks since heteroskedasticity is, in these cases, accounted for the parametric conditional Value-atRisk model. These values are 6.8%, 6.6% and 5.2% for, respectively, the (E j =⇒ B D e nsi ty P e r c e n t a g e o f 5 % -s i g n i fi c a n t l i n k s ( % ) E =⇒ B B u y E =⇒ B S e l l E =⇒ B Figure 10 : The black (continuous), the red (dotted) and the blue (with filled circles) lines represent, respectively, the density of the percentage of 5%-significant links according to the (E j =⇒ B Buy i ), (E j =⇒ B Sell i ) and (E j =⇒ B i ) causality test. The density is computed over 1000 replications of a bootstrap procedure in which, for each replication, a new set of 33 equity log-returns and 36 bond yield variations is formed by randomly extracting with replacement 400 observations from the original time series. Densities are normalized to have an integral equal to one. Figure 11: This figure depicts, for each time-window t = 1, ..., 99 whose closure is at day e t (reported in the horizontal axis), the t-statistic of β t in (15) where the dependent variable Y i,t is the ranking of the variable s S i,t defined in (13) and computed in the forecasting horizon (e t , e t + H], with H = 360. Each column corresponds to a different regressor X i,t in (15). More precisely, X i,t = H B+ i,t for the first, X i,t = H B− i,t for the second and X i,t = H i,t for the third. A black point is reported whenever the regression (16) is significantly better (according to the log-likelihood ratio test of Vuong (1989) with 95% confidence) than the simple auto-regressive model (14). Horizontal red dotted lines are in correspondence of 95% confidence level of the standard Normal distribution.
